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Display and Fiscal
Techniques:
Some
Notes
on
Recent Strategies to Counteract
Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing

Sovereign

Magnus Hornqvist*
ABSTRACT

Over recent decades, the state has come to increasingly
rearticulatesovereignty at the very center of society. To support
the thesis of a migration of sovereignty from the periphery to the
center, from the punishment of marginalized groups to the
regulation of economic transactions, this Article sketches the
development of rules, monitoring, and sanctions-the three
phases of regulation in the strict sense-with respect to first tax
evasion and undeclared work and then organized crime, money
laundering, and terrorist financing. Unbounded reasons of
state, symbolic authority, and conflicts with formidable foes are
found to be expressed in the economic sphere, which resonates
with a reconstructed classical understanding of sovereignty,
found in classical political theory. The spread of techniques
across administrativedomains is traced through organizational
documents and interviews with practitioners and moreover is
related to an observed trend toward integration between crime
control and business regulation. The regulatory approaches
transcend the categories developed by research traditions
separated by the criminal law. In this way, the analysis may
contribute to an integrated understandingof the contemporary
regulatory state.

* Magnus Hornqvist is Associate Professor at the Department of Criminology,
Stockholm University.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

"Everywhere," Joseph Schumpeter said at the time of the First
World War, the tax state "confronts the private economies with
relatively few means." The main purpose of taxation was to finance
the war effort. In more recent times, over the very last decades, as
organized crime and terrorist financing came to be seen as submerged
in the regular economy, governments turned toward the instruments
of taxation for different reasons. While taxation still provided the
necessary funding, now the fiscal regimes themselves were used to
counteract terrorism and organized crime and to differentiate the
2
associated money trails from other kinds of business transactions.

1.
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY OF CAPITALISM
111 (Richard Swedberg ed., 1990).
2.
See generally Petrus C. van Duyne, Crime and Commercial Activity: An
Introduction to Two Half-Brothers, in THE ORGANISED CRIME EcONOMY: MANAGING
CRIME MARKETS IN EUROPE 1 (2005) (discussing the complex interconnection between
transnational organized crime and commercial activity); Michael Levi, Combating the
Financingof Terrorism:A History and Assessment of the Control of 'Threat Finance', 50
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 650 (2010) (assessing historical and current measures against
terrorism financing); Mark Pieth, Criminalizing the Financingof Terrorism, 4 J. INT'L.
CRIM. JUST. 1074 (2006) (analyzing policies associated with examining money trailsto
counter terrorist finance); Action Plan to Combat Organized Crime, 1997 O.J. (C 251)
1, 3; Directive 2005/60/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26
October 2005 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 2005 O.J. (L309) 15, 15-20 [hereinafter
Directive 2005/60/EC];
Financial Action Task
Force [FATF],
FATF 40
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The transfer into new policy arenas was made possible by significant
sharpening of the available fiscal instruments, which was carried out
for the original reason of state funding. In a range of countries, tax
regimes had evolved into powerful mechanisms of control in the
administrative pursuit of tax evasion. 3 The two developments
originated in different policy contexts: criminal justice and business
regulation. This Article explores the developments leading up to the
recent intersection of criminal justice and business regulation, as well
as the possible implications of this intersection.
Whether current strategies towards tax evasion, organized
crime, money laundering, and terrorist financing should be
understood along the lines of policing, or along the lines of regulation,
would appear to be an issue of some importance. The two concepts are
associated with different research focuses. 4 As several commentators
have noted, there is literature on regulation and on policing, which
unfolds on parallel tracks.5 The division of academic labor goes back
to institutional developments in the mid-nineteenth century. For a
long time, business regulation and policing were deployed separately,
differentiated by the creation of modern police forces and prisons.
During the course of the nineteenth century, policing was referred to
a specialist agency, with specially trained personnel performing
functions of order, maintenance, and crime control. This led to
specialization: a "uniformed paramilitary police, preoccupied with the
punitive regulation of the poor," whereas "business regulation became

&

Recommendations
(Oct.
2003),
www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
FATF%20Standards%20-%2040%2ORecommendations%20rc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4ZBP-333J] (archived Sept. 30, 2017); R. T. NAYLOR, WAGE OF CRIME:
BLACK MARKETS, ILLEGAL FINANCE, AND THE UNDERWORLD ECONOMY (2002)
(discussing financial operations funding terrorism and organized crime).
Justitiedepartementet, Ds 2008:38 Nationell mobilisering mot den grova
3.
organiserade brottsligheten - overvdganden och fdrslag (Swed.); JOHN BRAITHWAITE
PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION, 88-142 (2000); JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
MARKETS IN VICE, MARKETS IN VIRTUE (2005); Organisation for Economic Co-operation

-

& Development [OECD], Tax Administration Guidance & Information Series (Mar.
2011), www.oecd.org/tax/administration/42419552.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4YD9-JBZN]
(archived Sept. 30, 2017).
4.
Interestingly, Masciandaro et al. have noted a related dualism in
economics, or research on the activities that are subject to regulation. Economists have
traditionally focused on 'legal financial transactions, while the economics of crime
following Becker - has neglected the financial aspects.' Criminal economic activities
are either absent from the analysis, or are placed in the foreground, overshadowing
other aspects. See DONATO MASCIANDARO, ELOD TAKATs & BRIGITTE UNGER, BLACK
FINANCE: THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY LAUNDERING, at ix (2007).
5.
See generally LORRAINE MAZEROLLE & JANET RANSLEY, THIRD PARTY

POLICING 23-44 (Alfred Blumstein & David P. Farrington eds., 2005); CHRISTINE
PARKER ET AL., REGULATING LAW (2004) (discussing regulation in various areas of law);

Peter Gill, Policing and Regulation: What is the Difference?, 11 Soc. & LEGAL STUD.
523 (2002) (discussing the distinctions and similarities between policing and
regulation).

936

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL.5o0:933

variegated into many different specialist regulatory branches." 6 As a
result, policing came to be associated with street-level crime, whereas
regulation was instead associated with the complexities of business
and market governance. Current institutional reshuffling, however,
has complicated the picture.
This Article argues, first of all, that a number of state strategies
operate in ways that make traditional distinctions between policing
and
more
untenable. 7 Secondly,
and
regulation
largely
controversially, it argues that the analyzed strategies involve a
rearticulation of sovereignty at the center of society.8 The Article is
divided into two Parts, one conceptual and one historical. The first
Part takes issue with the assignment of sovereignty to the periphery,
to the sphere of criminology, and to the policing and the punishment
of marginalized groups, at a safe analytic distance from core societal
processes. Over recent decades, state strategies to combat tax
evasion, undeclared work, organized crime, and terrorist financing
may be seen to have once again articulated sovereignty within the
economic field. Analytically, sovereignty thus seems to be moving
from the periphery to the center. 9 In the historical Part, the
argument is that although state control vis-A-vis predominantly legal
companies and state control vis-a-vis predominantly criminal
companies have developed separately, and from different points of
departure, there is nevertheless a noticeable convergence between the
developments. Simply put, and allowing for national variations, over
the last decades there is more policing (crime control, intelligence
techniques, and on-site inspections) in relation to ordinary business,
and there is more regulation (taxation, financial monitoring, and
reporting requirements) in relation to organized crime. As a
consequence, irrespective of whether the individual companies are
legal or not, they tend to be confronted with the same requirementsmonitoring, sanctions, and institutions.

JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATORY CAPITALISM: How IT WORKS, IDEAS FOR
6.
MAKING IT WORK BETTER 13-14 (2008).

&

7.
For a discussion of remaining differences, which will not be discussed in
this paper, see Magnus Hornqvist, Regulating Business or Policing Crime? Tracing the
Policy Convergence Between Taxation and Crime Control at the Local Level, 9 REG.
GOVERNANCE 352, 352-66 (2015) [hereinafter Taxation and Crime Control].
8.
For a discussion of the wider theoretical implications of this 'repositioning
of sovereignty,' which will not be pursued here, see Magnus H6rnqvist, Repositioning
Sovereignty? Sovereign Encounters With Organized Crime and Money Laundering in
the Realm of Accountants, 18 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 528, 538-41 (2014).
9.
Yet the sovereign element is primarily articulated in low-wage and serviceoriented sectors. The fiscal approach towards organized crime and the anti-money
laundering regime mainly, but not exclusively, capture smaller companies and minor
players in the construction, the restaurant, the cleaning, the road haulage, the taxi and
the removal sectors. See id. at 540; see also SOU, Branschsanering och andra metoder
mot ekobrott, Stockholm: Fritzes (1997).
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PART I: SOVEREIGNTY-FROM THE PERIPHERY TO THE CENTER?

The state strategies to counteract tax evasion, undeclared work,
organized crime, money laundering, and terrorist financing form part
of the state's long-standing monopoly on punishment and taxation;
moreover, they resonate with some of the most basic features of
sovereignty. Historically, sovereignty was used to vindicate the
worldly concerns of the heads of state over the religious
establishment when the concept was introduced in the sixteenth
century.1o The economic aspect was central at the outset. Long before
the advent of capitalism, economic activity was immersed in
sovereign concerns. Such concerns found their way into the doctrine
of mercantilism, which influenced European economic policy for two
centuries, held together by the view that commerce was above all a
means to "achieve greater national power and glory." 1 1 Over the
centuries, it has been articulated in state action by regents,
governments, and local agencies. What appears to be at stake is the
essence of statehood. Sovereignty is conceptually linked to the state,
and specifically to the state. It has been referred to as "the struts and
joists without which statecraft would not exist." 12 At bottom, there is
the capacity to use force. As Max Weber emphasized, the basic
characteristic of the state is its successful monopolization of the
legitimate use of violence. 13 Within a given jurisdiction, the state has
the primary right and also a superior capacity to use force. Both
aspects are essential. State sovereignty presupposes a legal
dimension in addition to the position of strength in relation to
competitors.
The split between legality and actuality was present in the very
first writings on sovereignty. Jean Bodin spoke of sovereign
"prerogatives" (marques), ambiguously referring to the distinguishing
characteristics as well as the juridical rights of sovereignty. 14 The
sovereign state may use force whenever it prefers to do so. Yet any
intervention must be legal. The two sources-the supreme power and
the fundamental legality-are intimately connected. One influential
model proposed that legality was grounded on the decision of a

10.
11.

WENDY BROWN, WALLED STATES, WANING SOVEREIGNTY 28 (2010).
Lars G. Magnusson, Mercantilism, in A COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF

ECONOMIC THOUGHT 46, 56 (Warren J. Samuels et al. eds., 2003).
12.
Daniel Philpott, Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History, 48 J. INT'L
AFF. 353, 354 (1995).
13.
MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFr: GRUNDRISS DER
VERSTEHENDEN SOZIOLOGIE (J. C. B. Mohr Tiibingen 1972).
14.
JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE SIX BOOKS OF
THE COMMONWEALTH 46 (Julian H. Franklin ed., trans., 1992).
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supreme power, and nothing else. 15 While recognizing that all
violence must be cast in a juridical form, the legality was seen to be
unrelated to substantive considerations.
In addition, there is the element of violence beyond all
justification, which is unacknowledged but inherent in the classical
theories on sovereignty.16 When the state monopolized the legitimate
use of violence, it simultaneously retained illegitimate violence as a
prerequisite for sovereignty. This extra-legal violence has also been
discussed in terms of "state crime"1 7 or "homo sacer."1 8 It presupposes
a binary split within the population, with the excessive violence then
being exercised against certain categories of individuals on the
margins of society. In an economic context, on the other hand, the
fundamentally legal violence can be expected to be more prominent.
It has been said that the sovereign mandate is tied to the
establishment of order, both in the market and in general. 19 In
Hobbes's famous defense, sovereignty was the precondition for social
order.2 0 Yet it is also, at a more basic level, not tied to any specific
goals at all. As Foucault remarked in relation to the original sense of
raison d'Etat, "there is no prior, external purpose, or even a purpose
subsequent to the state itself."2 1 The French Cardinal Richelieu first
articulated the notion of "reason of state" together with sovereignty in
the seventeenth century. The implication was that any manifestation
of state power was above moral concerns. 22 Sovereignty is
ungrounded in the sense that it escapes all considerations of utility. It
is not limited, or justified, by goal satisfaction. In a similar vein,
Hanna Arendt described sovereignty as the assertion of a solipsistic

15.
CARL SCI-rMIT, DER BEGRIFF DES POLITISCHEN: TEXT VON 1932 MIT EINEM
VORWORT UND DREI COROLLARIEN (Duncker & Humblot 2009).
16.
DANIEL LOICK, KRITIK DER SOUVERANITAT (2012).
17.
See generally PENNY GREEN & TONY WARD, STATE CRIME: GOVERMENTS,
VIOLENCE AND CORRUPTION (2004) (discussing state-sponsored terrorism).
18.
See generally GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND

BARE LIFE (1998) (discussing the implicit nature of sovereignty as power over life).
19.
Slavoj Zifek, Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics,in THE CHALLENGE OF
CARL SCHMITT 18-37 (Chantal Mouffe ed., 1999); see generally David Pan, Against
Biopolitics: Walter Benjamin, Carl Schmitt, and Giorgio Agamben on Political
Sovereignty and Symbolic Order, 82 GERMAN Q. 42 (2009) (analyzing the sovereign
mandate and perspectives on cultural and political theory).
20.
See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Oxford University Press 1985)
(discussing social contract theory and rule by an absolute sovereign).
21.

MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE

COLLEGE DE FRANCE, 1977-1978, at 258 (Michel Senellart & Frangois Ewald eds.,
Graham Burchell trans., 2007).
22.
Luc Foisneau, Sovereignty and Reason of State: Bodin, Botero, Richelieu
and Hobbes, in THE RECEPTION OF BODIN: RECEPTION OF BODIN HISTORY 323, 334

(Howell A. Lloyd ed., 2013).

SOVEREIGN DISPLAYAND FISCAL TECHNIQUES

20ly]

939

will. 23 The will of the sovereign is absolute and does not recognize the
needs or goals of the surrounding world.
The claim to absolute supremacy is either celebrated or abhorred
in the discourse on sovereignty. Yet the issue of its proper-as
opposed to unbounded-field of application has also been discussed
ever since sovereignty was first conceptualized. At least four areas in
which sovereignty is exercised can be seen to recur across the
centuries. The state can wage wars against other nations, lay down
laws for citizens, punish law-breakers, and tax economically active
subjects. Punishment and taxation, the two latter areas, are of
primary interest for the purposes of this Article. Along with
legislation and war making, they belong to the original sovereign
prerogatives. 24
Punishment is arguably the sovereign prerogative par excellence.
The exercise of violence against subjects who had contravened the
will of the heads of state was consonant with all the basic principles
of sovereignty. The state's right to tax its subjects was embraced less
unequivocally by the theoreticians of the early-modern state.
However, although both Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes were
hesitant to entrust the sovereign with the right to tax, since this
threatened to infringe on property rights, for them taxation
nonetheless belonged to the order of sovereign powers as a special
case of legislation. 2 5 Ever since, taxation, or the forced acquisition of
economic value, has been a cornerstone on which state power has
rested.
A further aspect of sovereignty is that of symbolic authority,
which similarly has accompanied the concept from the outset. 26
Sovereignty is exercised towards subjects as criminals, taxpayers,
soldiers, or political opponents. Besides being exercised, however,
sovereignty is also displayed-towards everyone in their capacity as
spectators. As display, sovereignty entails a symbolic confirmation of
the supremacy of the state. Particularly when punishments are
exacted, the endangered order is ritually reinstated and the power of
the state appears uncontested. 27 Carl Schmitt saw the symbolic
authority as a theological remnant, the transfer of sacred aura to the

23.

See

generally HANNAH

ARENDT,

ON REVOLUTION

(1963)

(discussing

sovereignty and revolution).
24.

HOBBES, supra note 20, at 128-285; BODIN, supra note 14, at 46.

25.
See generally Dudley Jackson, Thomas Hobbes' Theory of Taxation, 21 POL.
STUD. 175, 178 (1973); Martin Wolfe, Jean Bodin on Taxes: The Sovereignty-Taxes
Paradox, 83 POL. SCI. Q. 268, 274-75 (June 1968).
26.
Quentin Skinner, The State, in POLITICAL INNOVATION AND CONCEPTUAL
CHANGE (Terence Ball et al. eds., 1989).
27.

PHILIP

SMITH,

PUNISHMENT

AND

CULTURE

punishment and meaning in relation to state power).

169-83

(2008)

(discussing
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secular state.2 8 The symbolisms of sovereignty were integral in his
conception of politics as the conflict between friend and foe. Drawing
the boundary between the representatives of the state as guardians of
order and, on the other hand, the state's enemies, belongs to the
fundamental operations of the state. 29 State strategies towards
organized crime inevitably draw on this existential conflict.
All aspects of sovereignty-the monopoly of violence, the
fundamental legality, the solipsistic will, the symbolic authority, and
the existential conflict between friend and foe-are typically
manifested in the punishment of criminal offences. But, as this
Article will argue, the economic sphere is by no means excluded. On
the contrary, sovereignty is also displayed vis-i-vis businesses. All
aspects of sovereignty are present in the interaction with the
economy. The monopoly of violence, cast in a legal form, is the
prerequisite for all regulation. Further, the symbolic authority of the
state is activated, for example, when members of business elites are
arrested following scandals. "The obvious discomfiture of previously
lionized executives now paraded in handcuffs is a public
demonstration of the enforcement myth," notes Justin O'Brien, "that
no one is above the equal application of the law."3 0 Yet the symbolic
aspect of sovereignty is equally present in the routine acts of
taxation, when property rights are overruled and the state's exclusive
right to confiscate resources is displayed. Forceful intrusions into the
economic sphere reaffirm the elevated position of the state, charged
with overall responsibility.
In a regulatory context, the most controversial aspect of
sovereignty is the assertion of solipsistic will. The basic absence of
considerations of utility not only is hard to accommodate within
prevailing approaches to regulation, but also challenges deeply held
assumptions about the relationship between state violence and the
market more generally. 3 1

III. PART II: TRACING THE REARTICULATION OF SOVEREIGNTY IN
ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICE
The regulatory approaches analyzed in this Article are punitive,
rule-based, and state-centered. For this reason, the observation to be
made is that the strategies constitute prime examples of government,
or a regulatory style which is very different from the dominant trend

28.
29.

SCHMTT, supra note 15.
Id.

30.
JUSTIN O'BRIEN, GOVERNING THE CORPORATION: REGUIATION
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF SCANDAL AND GLOBAL MARKETS 7 (2005).

31.

H6rnqvist, supra note 8, at 538-41.

AND
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towards governance. In the recent literature on new regulatory forms,
which document a growth of transnational governance, of standard
setting, and of soft regulation, state economic intervention based on
rules and sanctions is slightly patronizingly labelled "command-andcontrol regulation." Command-and-control regulation is considered
dated and marginalized by the new regulatory forms.32 To be sure,
the literature also contains counterexamples. The drift away from
punitive, rule-based, and state-centered regulation is not uniform.3 3
In the area of corporate harm, criminalization is one of several
techniques employed to discipline business. 34 The number of
counterexamples multiplies if critical work on policing and security is
taken into account. 35 Although not dominant, punitive, rule-based,
and state-centered approaches are still significant in the
contemporary regulatory landscape. 3 6 But the main thrust in the
literature is towards a regulatory state-territorially decentered,
involving a layered web of regulation, a variety of regulatory styles,
and an array of organizations ranging from the police, through the
tax agency, to private regulatory bodies.
In this story, there has been little place for sovereignty, except as
something that is being superseded--or reserved for marginal
populations. Few would deny its continued importance, yet the debate
is restricted to a focus on the extent of state control. In particular, the

32.
Marie-Laure Djelic & Kerstin Sahlin, Governance and Its Transnational
Dynamics: Towards a Reordering of Our World?, in ACCOUNTING, ORGANIZATIONS, AND
INSTITUTIONs : ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ANTHONY HOPWOOD 175, 178 (Christopher S.
Chapman et al. eds., 2009); MARIE-LAURE DJELIC & KERSTIN SAHLIN-ANDERSSON,
TRANSNATIoNAL

GOVERNANCE:

INSTITUTIONAL

DYNAMICS

OF REGULATION

(2006)

(discussing developments in transnational regulation); JACINT JORDANA & DAVID LEVIFAUR, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY REFORMS FOR
THE AGE OF GOVERNANCE 8-9 (2004); SOL PICCIOTTO, REGULATING GLOBAL CORPORATE

CAPITALISM (2011) (discussing corporate law and financial market regulation); Anthony
Ogus, Regulation Revisited, 2 PUB. L. 332 (2009) (discussing developments in
regulation and public policy from 1979 to 2008); Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley,
Organizations, Regulation, and Economic Behavior: Regulatory Dynamics and Forms
from the Nineteenth to Twenty-First Century, 4 ANN. REV. L. Soc. SCI. 31 (2008)
(examining the expansion of regulation from the nineteenth to twenty-first century).
See generally FIONA HAINES, THE PARADOX OF REGULATION: WHAT
33.
REGULATION CAN ACHIEVE AND WHAT IT CANNOT (2011); Robert Baldwin, The New

Punitive Regulation, 67 MOD. L. REV. 351 (2004) (discussing policy shifts toward
punitive regulation); Adam Crawford, Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory
State? Steering, Rowing and Anchoring the Provision of Policing and Security, 10
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 449 (2006) (discussing policing and security developments
in Britain's 'post-regulatory state').
34.
Steve Tombs & David Whyte, The State and Corporate Crime, in STATE,
POWER, CRIME 103 (Roy Coleman et al. eds., 2010).
35.

RICHARD V. ERICSON, CRIME IN AN INSECURE WORLD (2007); see generally

Simon Hallsworth & John Lea, Reconstructing Leviathan: Emerging Contours of the
Security State, 15 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 141 (2011) (discussing areas in which

the security state is emerging).
36.
HAINES, supra note 33, at 10.
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qualitative aspects of sovereignty are missing. To understand
sovereignty as something distinct from more-as opposed to lessstate control, the Article recovers a richer notion through a reading of
the classic tradition from Hobbes and Bodin. The classic concept of
sovereignty is essential since it captures the forceful intrusion by the
state into the economic sphere, an element of force that is related to
the preservation of the state rather than other considerations.
The Article focuses on how the state imposes requirements that
are linked to two core sovereign prerogatives-to punish and to taxon economic actors. In one sense this is an age-old story. The state's
current authority to punish and to tax stands in a historic continuity
from the sixteenth century.3 7 But it is an age-old story with a number
of recent twists. During the last decades, the sovereign concerns
insofar as they relate to the economy have been expressed in
strategies counteracting tax evasion, undeclared work, organized
crime, money laundering, and terrorist financing. The strategies have
in common that they combine taxation and punishment; involve a
series of new rules and new techniques for monitoring and
sanctioning economic actors; shape the preconditions for economic
activity in terms of compliance or avoidance costs; and unfold
independent of their market functionality. The common features are
elaborated upon in more detail later in this Part of the Article.
To support the thesis of a migration of sovereignty from the
periphery to the center, from the punishment of marginalized groups
to the regulation of economic transactions, the Article sketches the
development of rules, monitoring, and sanctions-the three phases of
regulation in the strict sense 3 8-with respect to first tax evasion and
undeclared work and then organized crime, money laundering, and
terrorist financing. When interviewing representatives from eleven
state organizations3 9 over a two-year period, these were the principal
strategies encountered-there may well be more-involving sovereign
goals and economic means. The interviews were conducted to acquire
the practitioner's understanding of the new economic policing
landscape, as well as detailed descriptions of individual control

37.
Skinner, supra note 26.
38.
The conception of regulation as a three-phase process comes close to what
Parker et al. call "a regulatory regime." See Introduction to REGULATING LAW, 1-5
(Christine Parker et. al. eds., 2004). But where they speak of "standards," allowing for
the regime to be organized around mutually agreed upon norms of conduct, I prefer to
speak of "rules," which simply presupposes authoritative force. See Introduction to A
READER ON REGULATION 3 (Robert Baldwin et. al. eds., 1998).

39.
The informants were in managerial positions, responsible for the
implementation of the new approaches, or were experienced investigators at The Tax
Agency, The Enforcement Agency, The Social Insurance Board, The Security Service,
The Tax Fraud Unit, The Financial Supervisory Authority, The Economic Crime
Authority, The Prosecution Authority, The Financial Intelligence Unit, The Swedish
Police, and The County Administrative Board of Stockholm.
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instruments in organizational practice. In conjunction with the
interviews, documents (policy papers, evaluations, guidelines,
reports, court cases, etc.) were retrieved containing historical
information on the regulation of tax evasion, undeclared work,
organized crime, money laundering, and terrorist financing. 40
The research was part of a larger project undertaken in Sweden,
and the organizations referred to are all part of the Swedish state. 4 1
The empirical evidence is thus limited to Sweden. The following
subpart will describe the evolution of policy and practice, answering
questions such as which measures were implemented when, what is
the subsequent use, how financial information is communicated, and
which organizations are involved. Close attention to specific measures
is required to catch the emergence of crime control, intelligence
techniques, and on-site inspections in relation to predominantly legal
business and the growing elements of taxation, reporting
requirements, and financial monitoring in relation to predominantly
criminal business. No attempt is made to compare the Swedish
development with the evolution of the corresponding rules,
monitoring, and sanctions in other countries. The research design
involved a case study, not a comparative approach. However, it is well
established that each of the general policy trends is international in
scope. State control strategies targeting tax evasion, organized crime,
money laundering, and terrorist financing have been adopted all over
the contemporary Western world. 42 For this reason, the theoretical
claim extends to all advanced capitalist states, bearing in mind that
different legal and organizational environments imply national
variations.
The recent history of economic control will be written from two
different perspectives: from the point of view of business regulation
and from the point of view of crime control. The Article concentrates
on the regulatory changes themselves without venturing into the
actors and the contestations behind the changes. This is a desirable
undertaking in itself. To fully understand the new regulatory space, it
is necessary to probe into politics and "the pursuit of command over

40.
Information from the written documents is referenced in a conventional
manner, whereas statements from the interviews are synthesized and not referenced in
the text for reasons of readability.
41.
This study was conducted within the context of the project 'New risks and
actors. Terrorism and organized crime in the field of plural policing,' financed by the
Swedish Research Council, 2009-2014.
42.
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 3; van Duyne, supra note 2; Levi, supra note 2;
Pieth, supra note 2; OECD, supra note 3; Action Plan to Combat Organized Crime,
supranote 2; Directive 2005/60/EC, supra note 2; FATF, supranote 2.
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the regulatory process itself." 43 The objective here is instead to
establish its emergence and to discuss some of its implications.

A. The Rise of Fiscal Policing
1. Tax Evasion
The sovereign project of counteracting tax evasion presupposed a
complex regime of reporting requirements. Although taxation as such
is an ancient phenomenon, and the distribution of taxes among a
population belongs to the art of statecraft, it was not until more
recently that the state could tax according to received information on
economic transactions. In fact, all the discussed state strategies with
a significant sovereign element have one thing in common: the basic
operation
of processing information
on
everyday
economic
transactions. The enacted rules specify what financial information
should be submitted to whom; the monitoring techniques investigate
whether the submitted information is correct; and the sanctions are
actualized when it is found to differ from other, more reliable
information. The foundation is laid by rules on financial reporting
and by developments in accounting practices. The rise of fiscal
policing is to some extent a prosaic story of the gradual expansion of
reporting requirements. Since the 1960s, there has been an increase
in the regulation of mandatory disclosure of financial information.
More and more information has to be made public or reported to
special bodies. The development has been described in terms of an
"accounting revolution." 44 In the accounting literature, the term
"disclosure regime" has been used to describe the sum total of "legally
recognized information claims."4 5 The information claims primarily
cover financial reporting. Yet they may also relate to other
information beyond hard data on cash flow and sales. Due to financial
scandals and high-profile bankruptcies, it is also necessary to disclose
information on board members and risk management routines.46
Taxation and initiatives against money laundering equally depend on
the nature of the disclosure regime, and changes along with the
establishment of new information claims.

43.

LEIGH HANCHER & MICHAEL MORAN, CAPITALISM, CULTURE, AND ECONOMIC

REGULATION 287 (1989).
44.

WILLIAM H. BEAVER, FINANCIAL REPORTING: AN ACCOUNTING REVOLUTION

4 (2d ed. 1989).
45.
Jens Wilstemann, Disclosure Regimes and Corporate Governance, 159 J. OF
INSITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECON. 717, 717 (2003).

46.

See Michael Power, ORGANIZED UNCERTAINTY: DESIGNING A WORLD OF RISK
53-55 (2007); Philipp B. Volmer, J6rg Richard Werner & Jochen
Zimmermann, New Governance Modes for Germany's Financial Reporting System:
Another Retreat of the Nation State, 5 Socio-Econ. Rev. 437, 452 (2007).
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In Sweden, the general obligation to produce an income tax
return was introduced in 1902. Taxation based on income information
supplied by the taxpayers themselves had been tried earlier without
success, but this time the system with income tax returns was here to
stay. The reported information was used to determine the taxes for
all taxpayers, including companies. Although reporting misleading
information to evade taxation was criminalized in the same year, for
a long time the state simply had to trust the companies. It possessed
no means to corroborate the reported information. Only gradually
was an elaborate structure for supervision erected on the basis of the
taxation legislation. The Bookkeeping Act of 1929 was a first step as
it mandated all companies to keep record of their economic
transactions. But no state agency had the legal powers and the
techniques to access the information contained in the company's
accounts.47 Unless the company went bankrupt, in which case the
bookkeeping would be scrutinized to establish assets, the financial
information was out of reach for the state.
The situation changed in 1955 with the introduction of the field
audit. The tax agency was for the first time allowed to control the
reported information at will. The field audit was originally described
by the legislators as form of control where "the taxation authority not
only scrutinizes the tax return and the documents belonging it, but
also the also the basic data." 48 The auditors visit the company to
obtain first-hand financial information (accounts, invoices, etc.),
which is then compared with the information reported in the tax
return. The procedure allows the tax agency to detect any
discrepancies, such as underreporting income or inflating costs. Field
audits in a sense revolutionized state regulation of economic
transactions, and it is still the basic operation for all kinds of fiscal
policing, whether directed against tax evasion, undeclared work,
organized crime, or money laundering. It is also the most powerful
tool in existence to control the companies' financial reporting. No
prior suspicion is needed. On the contrary, field audits were from the
outset meant to be performed on a regular basis and include
companies that were the least likely to manipulate.
But the revolution of fiscal policing came slowly. The tax agency
initially lacked the administrative capacity to carry out field audits
en masse. It also lacked the knowledge
ssential to the current riskbased approach-of what profit rates and levels or value added taxes

47.
Riksskatteverket, RSV Rapport 1983:1 Skatter och skattekontroll.
F6rutsdttningarfor en effektiv kontrollverksamhet (Swed.) [hereinafter RSV Rapport
1983:1].
48.
ATLE ERIKSSON, OM PAFOLJDER AV BROTT MOT SKATIEFORFATTNINGARNA
SAMT OM TAXERINGSREVISION OCH HANDRACKNING I SAMBAND MED TAXERINGSKONTROLL

10 (Skattenyt 1961).
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could typically be expected in different branches. This was
confounded with a tradition of lay involvement in the monitoring
procedure and a focus on the individual taxpayer rather than the
companies. But the capacity and the ambition to control companies
evolved during the decades, and by the 1970s, the tax agency
performed thousands of audits each year for control purposes and
considered itself to have a fairly good picture on how business was
made in different branches and which entries in the tax returns were
prone to be manipulated. 49 The shift of control focus and the resulting
knowledge of branches constituted substantial steps towards the
specific project of counteracting tax evasion, as opposed to simply
collecting taxes. What was lacking, seen from a current standpoint,
was a notion of the total extent of the tax evasion, as well as an
organizational ambition to reduce it. Though not a concern at the
time, as no real goal was formulated up until the 1980s, in the
following decades the tax agency would, like many other state
organizations, become increasingly goal-oriented.5 0 Adopting the goal
of reducing the tax gap, formulated in monetary terms as the
difference between the theoretically correct taxation and the actual
taxation,5 1 gave the tax agency a direction. Field audits, bankruptcy
investigations, and other forms of fiscal policing were integrated in a
strategy to counteract tax evasion.
The same period witnessed a considerable growth of sanctioning,
both in terms of introduction of new types of sanctions and in terms of
their subsequent use. To some extent, it was a consequence of the
monitoring expansion. The number of suspected violations of the tax
and the accounting legislation grew along with the control of the
companies' financial reporting. As these violations strictly speaking
always were violations of the criminal law, the tax agency would
report the cases of misleading information or missing records to the
police. Even minor irregularities were processed through the regular
criminal justice system, resulting in fines, or more rarely, in
imprisonment. In 1972, however, a parallel administrative
sanctioning track was created. The new sanctions were strictly
monetary: the tax payer had to pay the estimated tax evasion itself
and, in addition, half of that amount as a penalty. The retaxation as
well as the tax surcharge were determined by the tax agency and

49.
RSV Rapport 1983:1, supra note 47; Proposition 1975:87 Om riktlinjer for
eindrad skatteadministration och taxering i forsta instans, m.m. [government bill]
(Swed.).
50.
RSV Rapport 1983:1, supra note 47; Riksskatteverket, RSV Rapport 1998:3
Skattefel och skattefusk. En utudrderingav skattekontrollen 1992-1997 (Swed.).
51.
Riksskatteverket, Tax Gap Map for Sweden: How was it Created and How
Can it Be Used? 9 (2008), https://www.skatteverket.se/download/18.361dc8c
15312eff6fd2b9a4/1473840293366/Report_2008 1B.pdf
[https://perma.cclD98J-3862]
(archived on Sept. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Tax Gap Map].
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could be appealed to the administrative courts. 52 In this way, a large
number of cases were diverted from the criminal courts.
The palette of sanctions would be further widened in the 1980s.
Following a heightened political interest in white-collar crime, new
punishments were introduced to keep unscrupulous economic actors
out of business for an extended period of time. The sanctions involved
a ban on providing economic counseling or a ban on engaging in
economic activities altogether, yet none have been much used in
practice. The criminal justice system remains a significant source of
punishment, and over the last decade, there has been a steady
increase in reported tax and accounting crime. At the same time, the
administrative sanctioning system has attained a routine character
and outgrown the criminal courts in terms of decisions.5 3
2. Undeclared Work
Undeclared work constitutes one form of tax evasion, which in
recent years has spurred a specific series of regulatory inventions
similar to ordinary policing. The discovery of undeclared work-and
its subsequent politicization-was in a way a function of the extended
fiscal control activity itself. As the tax agency built a capacity to
monitor the companies' financial performance, the field auditors
found a widespread practice of underreporting cash transactions. The
transactions involved undeclared wage payments, undeclared sales,
and unreported withdrawals. Large sums of money were in
circulation that could not be taxed. In particular, by remunerating
the workforce cash in hand, the companies could avoid the payroll
tax. For the tax agency that meant a loss equivalent to the payroll
tax, around 30 percent of the wage, plus what the employee would
have paid as income tax. Expressed in terms of its organizational
goal, undeclared work was estimated to comprise half of the entire
tax gap, by far the single largest component, equivalent to SEK 66
billion. 54
The ambition to reduce undeclared work has not resulted in any
changes in the general framework of rules. Instead, it correlates with
a regulatory focus on certain branches. A number of branch-specific
rules have been enacted to reduce undeclared work in accordance
with the analysis that undeclared work is a problem above all in
smaller companies in the low-wage service sector. Just like the

52.
KARIN ALMGREN & BORJE LEIDHAMMAR, SKATTEPROCESSEN (2004); KARIN
ALMGREN & BORJE LEIDHAMMAR, SKATTETILLAGG OCH SKATTEBROTT (2006).

-

53.
Brottsforebyggande rAdet, Polisens satsning mot organiserad brottslighet.
En utvdrderingav 43 projekt, Rapport 2009:19 (2009); Skatteverket, Skatter i Sverige
Skattestatistisk Arsbok 2009 (2009) [hereinafter Skatter i Sverige].
54.
Tax Gap Map, supra note 51.
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overall strategy to reduce tax evasion, the focus on undeclared work
in certain branches originated with the intensification of fiscal
policing. In the 1970s, when the tax agency carried out large-scale
audit projects in entire branches, and the police for the first time
probed into "organized and economic crime," certain sectors were
singled out as more problematic than others. Smaller companies in
the construction, restaurant, cleaning, road haulage, taxi, and
removal sector were seen to be especially prone to tax evasion and
white-collar crime. Some of the companies were not even registered
with the authorities and hence could not be taxed at all.55 The control
focus on these particular branches has remained strikingly constant
ever since. The discussion of regulatory changes tailored to the
special conditions in for instance the construction and the restaurant
sectors dates back to the early 1980s. 56 However, it was not until very
recently that branch-specific rules were enacted to turn undeclared
work into declared work. Some of the more important rule changes
include the reverse charge of value added tax in the construction
sector, the updated staff registers in all restaurants and hairdressers,
and the certification of cash registers in the entire retail sector.5 7 The
common denominator is the ambition to interfere in the undeclared
cash flow, designing out noncompliance with the tax legislation.
In terms of regulatory change, the developments have been most
dramatic in the second phase of regulation. The powers, the ambition,
and the capacity to control undeclared work have expanded
significantly, within and beyond the tax agency. Counteracting
undeclared work first of all involved directing the general control
mechanisms towards the analyzed risk branches. Within the
branches, the tax agency had distilled indicators of noncompliance
from decades of field audit protocols and the huge amount of regular
tax data. The organization had a long tradition of using information
technology, and implementing an explicit risk management approach
in the 2000s was consistent with this tradition. 58 The approach
involved new ways to select objects for control. The tax agency had
assembled statistics of the expected turnover, the ordinary
expenditures, and the average profit for companies in the high-risk

55.
Riksskatteverket, Effektivare revision (1975); AMOB, Organiserad och
ekonomisk brottslighet i Sverige (Rikspolisstyrelsen/Arbetsgruppen mot organiserad
brottslighet 1977).
56.
Lars E. Korsell, Ekobrott, liksom!, 10 SVENSK JURISTrDNING 932, 951
(2000) (A 1984 report authored by the Statens Offentliga Utredningar suggested that
financial taxes and fees should be introduced in the construction and restaurant
industries).
57.
Prop. 2005/06:130 OmvAnd skattskyldighet for mervardesskatt inom
byggsektorn [government bill] (Swed.); Prop. 2005/06:169 Effektivare skattekontroll
m.m. [government bill] (Swed.); Prop. 2006/07:105 Konkurrens pA lika villkor i
kontantbranschen [government bill] (Swed.).
58.
Skatteverket, Rapport 2005:8 Riskvdrdering. Metoder och principen (2008).
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branches, for instance a restaurant or a taxi business. Data mining
instruments would then work their way through large computerized
registers guided by the statistical information. As a consequence, any
deviations from the established patterns in the produced tax returns
could trigger a control. However, the control itself was largely the
same as before: field audits and desk audits were used to reconstruct
the money trail and to detect irregularities in the available
documentation.
In addition, new control measures were invented to monitor the
branch-specific rules. The tax agency performs unannounced field
inspections in restaurants, in hairdressers, on construction sites, in
taxi cars, and in any regular store. In 2008, eighteen thousand
unannounced inspections were carried out in restaurants to control
the staff registers and whether they correspond to the workforce
present.59 The tax agency also conducts field visits at construction
sites, demanding identification of the workers and proof of tax
registration. Further, tax inspectors may step into regular stores and
control the cash registers to see whether they are certified or have
been manipulated. The organization intends to carry out seventy-five
thousand such inspections per year. 60 These kinds of field inspections
are tied to the branch-specific rules and did not exist prior to them.
They are simpler and less time-consuming than field audits, but the
sheer volume of inspections represents a remarkable policing
presence in the low-wage service sectors.
Undeclared work is pursued through a combination of massive
presence and in-depth investigation. The control effect of the
unannounced field inspections was reinforced by the intelligencebased techniques. Intelligence formerly had been considered police
work in the strict sense but came to be entrusted to new actors in the
field of taxation. In the beginning of the 2000s, the tax agency
elaborated routines to carry out field observations strictly to gather
intelligence. The methods involved counting the number of customers
in a lunch restaurant, buying goods in a store for control purposes, or
surveilling a workshop to establish ongoing activity. 61 The
intelligence
thus
mainly
involved
unsophisticated
on-site
observations. In more complex cases, the tax agency cooperates with
other state organizations such as the police and the economic crime
authority. Together, they have targeted the larger players in the
trade with undeclared work, combining field audits, injunctions to

59.
Skatter i Sverige, supra note 53, at 249.
60.
Skatteverket, Skatteverkets faktablad om kassaregisterlagen(2010).
RSV Rapport 2002:4 Efterforskningsdtgdrder
61.
Riksskatteverket,
beskattnings- och brottsutredandeverksamhet (Swed.).
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third parties, account-information from banks, and police
intelligence. 6 2
The branch-specific regulatory focus is followed through in the
branch-specific sanctions. Detected violations of the branch-specific
rules are generally sanctioned through administrative fines. If the
company cannot present a staff register or a certified cash register, it
must pay a penalty charge according to a fixed table. The amount is
large enough to be detrimental to a small business with a limited
turnover. If the violations are more severe, if the cash registers are
systematically manipulated to underreport sales, if a part or the
entire wage of the workforce is undeclared, or if false invoices are
used to cover transactions to remunerate the workforce cash in hand,
the tax agency may hand over the investigation to the police and
criminal justice system. The enhanced monitoring is linked to a
significant increase in the number of individuals reported to the
police suspected of tax crime and false accounting, including
undeclared work, yet the development in terms of sanctions has so far
been more modest. The large majority of detected violations are
punished in a mundane fashion, involving administrative penalties.
But a significant minority of cases has been managed by the criminal
courts, resulting in harsh prison sentences when the undeclared work
is found to have generated substantial amounts of money on the
employer side.
Developments in the area of taxation since the 1960s, especially
with regard to small- and medium-sized companies in the service
sector, could be summarized as the prolonged rise of fiscal policing.
The monitoring techniques and the sanctions, the targets and the
institutional agents were either new or involved modifications of the
criminal justice infrastructure. The major players were for the most
part found outside of the criminal justice sector. A number of control
and sanctioning mechanisms were introduced and subsequently used
routinely and extensively. Field audits, field inspections, and
financial intelligence were policing methods transferred to an
economic context. The spread of tax surcharges, administrative fines,
and criminal convictions was an indicator of the increasing presence
of fiscal policing. The evidence consisted of documentation on money
trails and financial irregularities, and the targeted companies were in
the overwhelming majority of cases predominantly legal.

62.
Skatteverket, Slutrapportuthyrningavarbetskraft.Svartjobbsgranskningen
2006-2008 (2009) (Swed.).
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B. Catching Crime in a Web of Taxation and Reporting Requirements
1. Organized Crime
Traditionally, organized criminal activities are pursued by police
organizations, tried in criminal courts, and sanctioned with prison
sentences. Since the 1980s, however, a range of state agencies outside
of the criminal justice sector have become more and more involved in
the fight against organized crime, while adopting a strictly economic
approach towards monitoring and sanctioning. This development
runs parallel to a reinforced policing in the narrow sense. Organized
crime remains the prime target for criminal justice. The conventional
police organizations have all been mobilized to encounter what has
been ranked as a security threat since the late 1990s, with the
potential of disrupting the political and economic order. 63 However,
the rising symbolic importance of organized crime has also been
accompanied by a unified economic approach across the state
organizations involved. A new consensus has been established
according to which organized crime is essentially an economic matter.
From an economic point of view, the activities present a mix of
legality and illegality. What characterizes the criminally oriented
groupings from an economic viewpoint is a flexible relationship to the
legal framework-sometimes adhering to the basic rules of financial
reporting, sometimes ignoring them and taking precautions to avoid
detection.
The strategy starts from the official EU understanding of
organized crime as essentially illegal business. In Sweden, more than
ten state organizations, ranging from the social insurance board to
the security service, are organizationally involved in counteracting
organized crime. 64 As a result, organized crime confronts a new
policing landscape stretching far beyond the criminal justice system.
The involvement of new actors was consonant with a growing focus on
economic transactions. The strategy was only recently given a
name-summarized in the imperative "Follow the money!"-yet the
regulatory reorientation started already in the 1970s. 65 For more
than three decades, organized crime has increasingly been detected

63.
See Action Plan to Combat Organized Crime, supra note 2;
Justitiedepartementet, supra note 3; Ekobrottsmyndigheten (Swedish Economic Crime
Authority), Omvdrlds- och hotbildsanalys 2008 (2008) (Swed.).
64.
Brottsf6rebyggande ridet, Polisens satsning mot organiseradbrottslighet.
En utvrdering av 43 projekt, Rapport 2009:19 (2009); Justitiedepartementet, supra
note 3.
brottslighet
i
Sverige
Organiserad och
ekonomisk
65.
AMOB,
(Rikspolisstyrelsen/Arbetsgruppen mot organiserad brottslighet 1977); Statens
Offentliga Utredningar [SOUL 1997:111 Branschsanering och andra metoder mot
ekobrott [governement report series] (Swed.).
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and sanctioned through the expanded regulatory regime designed to
tax companies.
The economic approach towards organized crime is to a large
extent identical with fiscal policing in the predominantly legal
economy. All moments of regulation are the same; the difference lies
in the manner in which rules, monitoring techniques, and sanctions
are being applied. First of all, no separate rules have been adopted for
criminal economic activities. Organized crime is subject to the same
rules as any other business. The legislation on taxation, accounting,
company form, and bankruptcy are more often than not applicable to
activities associated with organized crime. Whereas the rules imply
compliance costs for legal companies, for organized crime above all
two consequences stand out: the profit opportunities and the
avoidance costs. Any regulation of legal economic activity establishes
the conditions for illegal economic activity by creating profitable
crime opportunities as well as by defining what must be evaded.
Circumventing the compliance costs associated with rule following, in
terms of taxation or reporting routines, implies a competitive
advantage over legal companies and a higher profit margin, whereas
the concomitant monitoring and sanctioning give rise to avoidance
costs. Fiscal policing necessarily entails duties for all business, and,
in this case, measures to avoid detection, taxes, and sanctions. This is
also an essential part of the strategy towards organized crime which
builds on the conscious use of monitoring and sanctioning to raise the
avoidance costs.
The illegal economic activity of organized crime, although
generally more complex than for instance false accounting detected in
relation to an ordinary bankruptcy, represents no fundamentally
different challenge to the regulatory frameworks surrounding
markets. The control techniques are the same. The field audits,
injunctions to third parties such as banks, unannounced field
inspections, and bankruptcy investigations detect irregularities
associated with organized crime as well as irregularities associated
with legal businesses. But when the techniques are applied to
organized crime, the objective is to punish-not to ensure compliance
with the taxation legislation-and to raise the avoidance costs. And
although the control techniques are the same, the manners in which
they are applied differ. In relation to tax evasion more generally, the
tax agency starts from the entire pool of financial information and
then singles out a number of actors for closer examination through a
complex selection process. In relation to organized crime, however,
the tax agency has been notified in advance whom to control. The
control selection is instead made by the police. All state
organizations, insofar as they are counteracting organized crime,
start from a number of designated actors whose identities are already
known and whose financial information will be scrutinized.
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The
multi-agency
approach
also
involves
multi-agency
sanctioning, which is a continuation of the multi-agency monitoring.
The police typically initiate the sanctioning process when requesting
information or assistance from the tax agency, the enforcement
agency, or the social insurance board. Each of these agencies is in
possession of specific sanctioning instruments. If the designated
individuals lack reported income, or have an income that is not
commensurate with the expenditures associated with their lifestyle,
the tax agency may demand extra taxes by means of discretionary
assessment and tax surcharges. Further, the special fraud
investigating unit within the social insurance board has made
extensive use of the lists produced by the police of individuals
associated with organized crime. Many of them also appear on the
lists of those who draw social benefits, and their use of sick leave, for
instance, is investigated in detail. Social benefits found to be received
on false grounds are subsequently reclaimed, in some cases resulting
in claims of substantial amounts as the incorrect payments extend
over several years. Finally, the enforcement agency may immediately
freeze the assets of individuals, who are arrested as part of an
ongoing criminal investigation. It can also enforce for instance
outstanding tax debts in a more traditional way. All of these
measures may be taken irrespective of whether the individual is
convicted of a crime, as they are either of an administrative nature or
not punishments at all, strictly speaking. Retaxation, enforcement of
debts, and withdrawn social benefits were originally not intended as
punishments, yet have been made to operate as such within the
concerted multi-agency approach.
It should be stressed that the imperative to "follow the money"
cannot be reduced to a policy level buzzword. Organizational practice
was deeply affected. The strategies toward organized crime and tax
evasion intersected in the pursuit of unreported transactions. A
shared focus on the financial reporting of smaller companies in the
low-end service sector was the joint policy implication. In a previous
study, I examined a sample of two hundred written decisions relating
to sanctions directed at restaurants in the three separate
organizational tracks associated with taxation, criminal justice, and
alcohol regulation. 66 The study indicates that the policy-level
intersection was followed through in a shared focus on unreported
transactions in organizational practice. The results from the fiscal
investigation, while embedded in new legal contexts, returned in
relatively unmodified form in the decisions on license revocations and
on criminal convictions. The focus on unreported transactions is,
thus, expanding across organizational and legal settings. In

66.

Hornqvist, supranote 7, at 355-56.
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comparison to the situation before the intersection between
"organized crime" and "tax evasion," the contrast is striking. The
written decisions from the 1990s contained no trace of attempts to
reconstruct
the real financial
transactions, whereas
such
reconstructions can now be produced at the level of individual
restaurants in a way that is sensitive to a given restaurant's peculiar
circumstances.
2. Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing
The global wave of anti-money laundering regulation reached
Sweden in 1991 following the enactment of the first money
laundering directive by the European Union. It has since been
extended in successive turns.6 7 The regulation responds according to
shifting sovereign priorities. In the early 2000s, the existing antimoney laundering regime, installed to fight drugs in the 1980s and
extended to fight organized crime in the 1990s, was transferred to a
new political arena: the fight against terrorism. Alongside the
military invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, the first move in
the War on Terror was to cut financing of suspected terrorist
activities. 68 In this context, the anti-money laundering regulation was
above all utilized to freeze assets and signal terrorist attacks in the
making. 69 Strengthened with the ambition to cut financing for
terrorism, the regulation was reinforced with new reporting
requirements. Rules on risk management routines have also been
adopted. According to the Third European Union Money Laundering
Directive from 2005,70 motivated by concerns of financial stability
and of terrorism, all companies are expected to maintain sufficient
routines for handling suspicious transactions, applying a risk-based
approach and customer due diligence. Before executing any
transaction, the currency exchange or the bank must know the
identity of the client, the purpose of the transaction and the market of
which it is part. If the company does not know the customer well
enough to be able to assess the risk of money laundering, it must not
proceed with the transaction. 7 1

67.
Statens Offentliga Utredningar
[SOU]
1997:34 Bekdmpande av
penningtvdtt, (Swed.); Statens Offentliga Utredningar [SOU] 2007:23 Genomforande av
tredje penningtvdttsdirektivet(Swed.) [hereinafter SOU 2007:23].
Levi, supra note 2.
68.
69.
See Nikos Passas & Samuel Munzele Maimbo, The Design, Development,
and Implementation of Regulatory and Supervisory Frameworks for Informal Funds
Transfer Systems, in COUNTERING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 174 (Thomas J.

Biersteker et al. eds., 2008); Phil Williams, Warning Indicatorsand Terrorist Finances,
in TERRORISM FINANCES AND STATE RESPONSES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 73

(Jeanne K. Giraldo & Harold A. Trinkunas eds., 2007); Levi, supra note 2, at 651-54.
70.
Directive 2005/60/EC, supra note 2.
71.
Id.; SOU 2007:23, supra note 67.
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What is regulated is not the money laundering actors
themselves, ranging from individual employers to terrorist groups,
but the entities with which they enter into business relations: banks,
remittances, currency exchanges, casinos, real estate agents, car
dealers, and jewellers. In particular, banks, remittances, and
currency exchanges are regarded as being indispensable to the
process of money laundering, regardless of their own intentions, 72 and
have for this reason been subjected to the extended reporting
requirements, monitoring, and sanctioning practices. They are
absolutely essential yet reluctant partners, with no inherent
incentive to report, a fact of which the regulators are well aware. The
responsibility for monitoring compliance is spread over five different
state organizations. The Financial Supervisory Authority is the main
player, and to the extent that compliance is being monitored in
practice, it is primarily carried out by this organization. The agency is
equipped with far-reaching policing powers, in particular since the
introduction of on-site inspections in 2008. Once a financial institute
is authorized, the financial supervisory authority can conduct on-site
inspections, announced or unannounced, to investigate compliance
The
specifically with the anti-money laundering legislation.
inspectors will go through available documentation, interview staff on
site, and request further relevant information. According to a
European Commission directive from 2006, the on-site inspections
"shall include the review of policies, procedures, books and records,
and shall extend to sample testing." 7 The reference to "sample
testing" means that risk assessments in individual cases can be
scrutinized-and questioned on the basis of the findings of the on-site
inspections.
The extension of policing powers has not been matched with an
equivalent increase of resources. The financial supervisory authority
performs few on-site inspections of authorized financial institutes and
cannot control nonauthorized financial institutes. The administrative
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sanctioning system has been in place for some time but is relatively
untested. Typically, the financial supervisory authority issues
warnings to noncompliant companies, followed by prescriptions on
how to improve the routines. Should the rules violations continue, the
same agency can resort to straightforward punishment: monetary
fines or revocation of the authorization. Over the last decade, the
regulatory pressure on the financial institutes has increased
significantly. The fines are designed to be tangible, with an upper
limit of 50 million SEK. In some much publicized cases-involving
both large banks and currency exchanges-the maximum amount
was demanded and upheld by the administrative courts. During the
years 2012 and 2016, two major banks were fined (one of them twice)
and one large chain of currency exchanges was deprived of its
authorization. 74 In context, the time period represents an
enforcement drive. The investigations, the sanctions, and the ensuing
public discussion have sent a clear message. It is currently not
possible for any major bank or currency exchange to disregard the
anti-money laundering regulation. The reputational risks, in
particular, are considerable. As a result, all large banks house
specialized units to discover suspicious transactions and, due to the
complexity of the regulatory requirements, there is an emerging
market for anti-money laundering consultants.
The specificity of the evolving anti-money laundering regime
could be seen to reside in the suspicious activity reports, although it
also involves advanced intelligence processing and new organizations
monitoring financial transactions. According to the official
definition, 75 money laundering can be part of a scheme to avoid
paying taxes, to remunerate undeclared work, to convert the proceeds
of crime into legal property, or to channel money to subversive
activities. It may involve many and complex steps, but some moves
are considered typical and are used as indicators, for example large
cash transactions, deviant transaction patterns, and unaccounted
transactions. Such transactions are "suspicious"; that is, they may
indicate money laundering.
The regulation is entirely rule-based. The anti-money laundering
rules enumerate which kinds of transactions are suspicious-and
must therefore be reported to the Financial Intelligence Unit, a
special organization within the Police. In particular, cash
transactions arouse attention. As long as amounts are simply
transferred between bank accounts, money is easy to follow for
investigators. But cash transactions involve a break in the chain,
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which allows individuals to hide the origins or the destination of the
money.
The suspicious activity reports provide input in a separate risk
communication system. All large banks, so far the major players as
regards the regulatees, have set up specialized reporting units to
manage the risk of money laundering. Typically, a deviant
transaction pattern within, for example, a small construction
company is discovered through the bank's risk management system;
the bank sends a report to the Financial Intelligence Unit, which
analyzes the information and requests further data from the bank,
such as a statement of accounts. The Financial Intelligence Unit will
then pass on the information. Depending on which, if any, connection
emerges-drugs,
fraud, tax evasion, terrorist financing-the
information is circulated to the intelligence sections of the Police, the
Customs Service, the Tax Fraud Units, or the Security Service. From
there, if the suspicion becomes reinforced, the costs and the proceeds
of the construction company may be further investigated by the
Prosecution Authority, the Economic Crime Authority, or the Tax
Agency.
The suspicious activity reports insert a wealth of new
information into an already existing general regulatory framework
composed of interlocking state organizations. The regulation has
created a separate communication system to uncover unwanted
economic activities that are difficult to detect in the ordinary taxrelated information. The system is closed, separate, and innovative. It
is closed in the sense that all information is classified, starting with
the suspicious activity reports. It is organizationally separate from
the monitoring of regular financial information. In this sense, the
money laundering regime is the direct opposite of the economic
approach to organized crime, which operates via existing
organizations and information flows. And it is innovative, since the
risk communication system unfolds independently of standard
accounting principles. Historically, financial accounting for investors
was closely associated with tax accounting for the state. 76 With the
creation of a risk communication system centered on "suspicious
transactions," however, the links to both taxation and investments
were weakened. The framework of reporting requirements on
financial transactions was extended to sovereign concerns other than
taxation, and the value of this move for economic decision making
was not even considered.
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One might think that the importance of the current anti-money
laundering regime lies in its capacity to extract financial information
from the private sector to pursue existential enemies associated with
terrorism and organized crime. The principal objective is
punishment-of drug-related crimes, organized crime, and terrorist
financing. In practice, however, it connects to other parts of the crime
control agenda, such as tax offenses. Although combating tax evasion
does not play a prominent role in the justification of anti-money
laundering measures, the information extracted has proven useful in
relation to this end. A study on the crimes detected via the stepwise
processing of suspicious activity reports in the Swedish anti-money
laundering system shows that the cases are dominated by tax
offenses, fraud, and the internet drug trade. The unreported
transactions often originate in the restaurant, construction, road
haulage, and other trades, where cash transactions have traditionally
been central, a prime example being remuneration of the workforce
using cash.77 Activities associated with more common understandings
of terrorism and of organized crime are absent.
The anti-money laundering regulation, like the regulatory
approach to organized crime, transcends traditional boundaries
between policing and regulation. The basic operation is the same:
collecting information on economic transactions and establishing
where the money comes from and where it goes. The information on
economic transactions is processed mainly in order to combat crime.
But the strategies draw information from different kinds of sources.
The economic approach to organized crime detected and sanctioned
economic irregularities mainly via the regulatory regime designed to
tax companies, whereas the separate risk communication system on
money laundering was created to identify precisely those economic
irregularities that were difficult to detect on the basis of this
everyday tax-related information. From that perspective, the
strategies could be seen to be complementary.
While the anti-money laundering regulation strictly speaking is
about processing financial information, in context it is about enemies
rather than economy. The approach has less to do with correcting
market failures than with pursuing enemies of the state. It was
developed based on the understanding that terrorism and organized
crime-formidable enemies, who were also pursued through
conventional wars and criminal justice-had become effectively
submerged in the economy. As economic actors, they were to be rooted
out and disrupted through the economy; that is, by tapping into
financial information being collected and circulated by other economic
actors. It has been described as a hidden war, consciously
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orchestrated by the Treasury. 7 Consequently, the anti-money
laundering regulation must be seen as a continuation of the tradition
in which the state asserts its authority, pursues its enemies, and
exacts tribute within the economic sphere.

IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that the recent state strategies to
counteract tax evasion, undeclared work, organized crime, money
laundering, and terrorist financing operate in ways that make any
distinction between crime control and business regulation largely
untenable. The regulatory approaches transcend the categories
developed by research traditions separated by the criminal law. The
types of law, the kinds of techniques, the justifications, the
jurisdictions, and the variety of sanctions associated with either
business regulation or traditional policing came to be used in concert,
or strategically superimposed on each other. In this way, the analysis
contributes to a more integrated understanding of the contemporary
regulatory state, territorially decentered, involving a variety of
regulatory styles and a layered web of organizations ranging from the
police, through the tax agency, to private regulatory bodies.
Moreover, the Article has argued that the recent state strategies
involve a rearticulation of sovereignty. It could be called "sovereignty
at center," as distinct from the more conventional "sovereignty at
periphery," which is implicated in the punishment of marginalized
groups. In particular, the regulatory approaches toward organized
crime and money laundering articulate sovereignty at the very heart
of society, in the economic sphere. According to the reconstructed
classical understanding, found in classical political theory,
sovereignty involves the monopoly of violence, a fundamental legality,
unbounded reasons of state, symbolic authority, and conflicts with
formidable foes. Current articulations of such elements in the
economic sphere were visible in the regulatory approaches to
organized crime and money laundering. The approaches targeted
existential enemies who were perceived to be submerged in the
economy and who had to be rooted out through the economy-by the
processing of financial information. The elements of display and of
overt violence were thus less conspicuous compared to sovereignty at
the periphery. Still, "sovereignty at the center" is characterized by a
fundamental complexity. Given the overall position of the state in the
social fabric, its sovereign interventions may amend market failures
to stabilize economic crises or to protect property rights. Yet the state
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can also assert its authority, affirm order ritually, and take tributes
regardless of economic repercussions. In such cases, it draws on a
long tradition of sovereignty as the assertion of a solipsistic will,
undisturbed by considerations of utility.

